Patents, Product Cycles and Non-Diversifiable Risk by Palokangas, Tapio
öMmföäflsäafaäsflassflassf
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Discussion Papers
Patents, Product Cycles and Non-Diversifiable
Risk
Tapio Palokangas
University of Helsinki and HECER
Discussion Paper No. 202
January 2008
ISSN 1795-0562
HECER – Helsinki Center of Economic Research, P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FI-00014
University of Helsinki, FINLAND, Tel +358-9-191-28780, Fax +358-9-191-28781,
E-mail info-hecer@helsinki.fi, Internet www.hecer.fi
HECER
Discussion Paper No. 202
Patents, Product Cycles and Non-Diversifiable
Risk*
Abstract
This study examines patents in an economy where R&D firms innovate and imitate and
households face non-diversifiable risk. Some characteristics of patents postpone the
expected time a patent will be imitated (e.g. increase patent length), while the others
protect the patentee's profits after a successful imitation (e.g. increase patent breadth). It is
shown that the less patient households, the shorter and broader the welfare-maximizing
patents.
JEL Classification: L11, L16, O31, O34.
Keywords: Patents, Imitation, Innovation, Product Cycles.
Tapio Palokangas
Department of Economics
University of Helsinki
P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7)
FI-00014 University of Helsinki
FINLAND
e-mail: tapio.palokangas@helsinki.fi
* Financial support from The Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
1 Introduction
In models of technological change with uncertainty, the assumption of the
diversifiable risk simplifies the analysis considerably. With that assumption,
firms can borrow any amount for R&D at a given interest rate and households
are protected from uncertainty through diversification in the market portfo-
lio. Consequently, the optimal length and breadth of patents can be judged
by the present value of investment projects independently of household pref-
erences. In contrast, I assume that households cannot wholly diversify their
investment risk. With that assumption, firms finance their R&D through
issuing shares and households purchasing these shares face the uncertainly
associated with investment. Consequently, there is a trade-off between patent
length and patent breadth through the proportions of innovating and imi-
tating firms in the entire product cycle and the welfare-maximizing shape of
patents depends on household preferences.
In a growth model of creative destruction, firms can step forward in the
quality ladders of technology by investing in R&D.1 If imitation is possible as
well, then economic growth is subject to product cycles as follows. Through
the development of new products, an innovator achieves a temporary ad-
vantage earning monopoly profits. This advantage ends when an imitator
succeeds in copying the innovation, enters the market and starts competing
with the innovator. The structure of a product cycle model is character-
ized in Fig. 1. Let 0 be the starting time at which an innovation occurs,
a the time at which the innovation is imitated, a + b the time at which an
innovation of the next generation occurs. The innovator possesses the whole
market during the imitative period [0, a) and the share φ1 ∈ (0, 1) of the
market during the innovative period [a, a + b), while the imitator possesses
nothing during [0, a) and the share 1− φ1 of the market during [a, a+ b). If
imitation is serially uncorrelated, then the probability of a successful imita-
tion is equal to the inverse of the time of the imitation, 1/a. If innovation is
serially uncorrelated, then the probability of a successful innovation is equal
to the inverse of the time of the innovation, 1/b.
A patent is an innovation that is protected by the authorities. In models
with no endogenous growth, the definition of patent length is commonly
1Cf. Grossman and Helpman (1991) (in ch. 4), and Aghion and Howitt (1998).
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Figure 1: Stages of the product cycle.
equal to patent life. In a model of endogenous growth, this is however not
adequate. Any patent will be first imitated and then replaced by a patent
of the next generation, usually before its lifetime. Thus, I define patent
length as the time the patentee earns full monopoly profit. In Fig. 1, this is
given by a.2 Following Denicolo (1996), Takalo (1998) and Kanniainen and
Stenbacka (2000), patent breadth (or width) can be proxied by the difference
between the flows of profits of an innovator and a successful imitator. On the
assumption that profits are proportional to the market share, Fig. 1 tells that
an innovator earns 1 immediately after the innovation and an imitator earns
1−φ1 immediately after the imitation. Patent breadth is then 1−(1−φ) = φ1.
The broader patents (i.e. the bigger φ1), the less an incumbent firm’s profit
falls with the entry of a new firm (i.e. the smaller 1− φ1).
Patents generate economic growth at the level of the whole economy,
but they are mainly a vehicle of taking over the market at the level of a
single firm. Because duopolists benefit but monopolies do not benefit from a
new innovation, an increase in the proportion of duopoly industries promotes
innovative R&D and economic growth. If patents are long (i.e. a high a in
Fig. 1), then the probability of a successful imitation, 1/a, is small, and if
patents are broad (i.e. φ1 is large in Fig. 1), then an imitator’s profit 1− φ1
2This definition of patent length is also equivalent to Horii and Iwaisako’s (2007) con-
cept of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR): If IPR is strengthened, the probability of a
successful imitation 1/a declines.
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is low after a successful imitation. Thus, there are two instruments, patent
length and patent breadth, by which the government can control innovative
and imitative R&D, economic growth and social welfare.
In my earlier work work on growth and competition policy (Palokan-
gas 2008), I have extended Wa¨lde’s (1999a, 1999b) growth model with non-
diversifiable risk for a multi-sector economy and incorporated Segerstrom
(1991) and Mukoyama’s (2003) ideas on product cycles and cumulative tech-
nology into it. In this study, I modify that model for patent policy and
introduce a benevolent government that controls patent length and patent
breadth. As a result, I obtain Pareto-optimal patent policy for an economy
with product cycles. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
The structure of the model is presented in section 2, the existence of the
equilibrium is proven in section 3 and the product cycle is constructed in
section 4. In sections 5 and 6, welfare-maximizing patents are established as
functions of the rate of time preference.
2 The model
There is a fixed number N of households, each of which supplies one labor
unit. All labor is homogeneous and can be used both in production and in
R&D. Because the labor market is competitive, aggregate labor supply N is
equal to employment in production, x, and labor devoted to R&D, l:
N = x+ l. (1)
Because in the model there is no money that would pin down the nominal
price level at any time, it is convenient to normalize the households’ total
spending in consumption at unity:
Py = 1, y
.
=
N∑
ι=1
Cι, (2)
where y aggregate consumption, P the consumption price and Cι consump-
tion by household ι ∈ {1, ..., N}. The utility for a single household ι ∈
{1, ..., N} from an infinite stream of consumption Cι beginning at time T is
U(Cι, T ) = E
∫ ∞
T
Cσι e
−ρ(t−T )dt with 0 < σ < 1 and ρ > 0, (3)
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where t is time, E the expectation operator, ρ the rate of time preference
and (1− σ) is the constant rate of relative risk aversion.
Because R&D firms finance their expenditure by issuing shares and the
households save only in these shares, aggregate income is equal to the value
of consumption, Py, plus wages paid in R&D, wl, where w is the wage and
l labor devoted to R&D. Given (2), it is then true that
N∑
ι=1
Aι = wl + Py = wl + 1, (4)
where Aι is the income of household ι ∈ {1, ..., N} and
∑N
ι=1Aι aggregate
income. All households are risk averters and share the same preferences.
Competitive firms produce the consumption good from a great number
of intermediate goods that are evenly placed over the limit [0, 1]. Each inter-
mediate good j ∈ [0, 1] is a composite good of the products of a number nj
of firms in industry j ∈ [0, 1]. Because a broader variety of products provides
more services to households, an increase in the total number of firms nj in any
industry j raises every household’s welfare.3 Aggregate consumption is then
produced from the products xjκ of all firms κ ∈ {1, ..., nj} in all industries
j ∈ [0, 1] through Cobb-Douglas technology as follows:
log y =
∫ 1
0
log(n²jBjxj)dj =
∫ 1
0
log(Bjxj)dj + ²
∫ 1
0
log njdj, ² > 0,
log xj =
nj∑
κ=1
φκ log
(xjκ
φκ
)
, φκ > φκ+1 for κ < nj,
nj∑
κ=1
φκ = 1, (5)
where nj is the number of firms in industry j, Bj the productivity parameter
in industry j, xj the quantity of intermediate good j, φκ the constant weight
of the κth firm’s product xjκ in the production of intermediate good j in
industry j, and ² is a constant.
In any industry j, the first firm is always an innovator, while the rest
κ = 2, ..., nj are imitators. In equilibrium, by (5), firm κ’s market share is
equal to φκ. The entry of new firms through successful imitations decreases
3In general, the property that product variety increases welfare is commonly established
through a CES production function. In this study, the replacement of the Cobb-Douglas
function (5) by a CES function would excessively complicate the analysis.
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the innovator’s market share.4 I assume that patent breadth ϕ is the gov-
ernment’s policy variable that decreases the imitators’ market shares:
φκ(ϕ) with φ
′
κ < 0 for κ > 1. (6)
When patents are broader, the imitators κ > 1 have less properties in their
products and they are able to supply less variants of the innovated good.
Consequently, their market shares φκ fall. From (5) and (6) imply that the
innovator’s market share φ1 is an increasing function of patent breadth ϕ.
The productivity parameter in industry j [Cf. (5)] is determined by
Bj
.
= µτj , µ > 1, (7)
where µ is a parameter and τj an index of technology in industry j. The
invention of a new technology in industry j raises the index τj by one and
the level of productivity by µ > 1.
There are two types of R&D in any industry: innovative R&D that
aims at creating a new state-of-the-art product in the industry; and imita-
tive R&D that aims at creating a close substitute for the incumbent state-
of-the-art product at the same level of technology. Following Palokangas
(2008), I assume that there are constant returns to scale in imitative, but
decreasing returns to scale in innovative R&D, for simplicity. Following Horii
and Iwaisako (2007), this can be justified by the possibility of duplication:
when two workers innovate in the same industry, they produce very likely
less than a double amount of innovations. With constant returns to scale for
all R&D, households would invest entirely in either innovating or imitating
R&D depending on which one of these yields a higher rate of return.
When firm κ in industry j innovates, its technological change follows a
Poisson process qjκ in which the arrival rate of innovations, Λjκ, is
Λjκ = λl
1−ν
jκ , λ > 0, 0 < ν < 1, (8)
where ljκ is the firm’s labor input and λ and ν are constants. During a short
time interval dt, there is an innovation dqjκ = 1 in firm κ with probability
Λjκdt, and no innovation dqjκ = 0 with probability 1− Λjκdt.
4I ignore the possibility that firms 3, ..., nj crowd out the market share of the second
firm, for simplicity. Since in equilibrium there will be only two producers per industry,
this would only complicate the model without any change in the results.
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I use he relative productivity between imitative and innovative R&D, a,
as a proxy for patent length. The bigger a, the more difficult it is to imitate
and the longer time it takes to produce a successful imitation for an invention.
When firm κ in industry j imitates, its technological change follows a Poisson
process Qjκ in which the arrival rate of imitations is in fixed proportion λ/a
to the firm’s own labor input ljκ:
Γjκ = (λ/a)ljκ, a > 0. (9)
During a short time interval dt, there is an imitation dQjκ = 1 with proba-
bility Γjκdt, and no imitation dQjκ = 0 with probability 1− Γjκdt.
Each R&D firm distributes its profit among those who had financed it
in proportion to their investment in the firm. Because both innovation and
imitation follow a Poisson process, the values of shares in R&D projects
are random variables and household ι ∈ {1, ..., N} maximizes its utility (3)
subject to the random development of these values.
3 The steady-state equilibrium
In this section, I prove the existence of the following equilibrium:
Definition. The economy is in a stationary-state equilibrium, if the follow-
ing properties are satisfied:
(i) The industries j are run either by monopolies (nj = 1) or duopolies
(nj = 2). Non-producing outsiders imitate to enter any of the monopoly
industries and the incumbent duopolists innovate to become a monopoly
in the same industry.
(ii) The proportions of monopoly and duopoly industries in the economy
(denoted α and β, respectively) are constants over time. Every time a
new superior-quality product is discovered in some industry, changing
this from a duopoly into a monopoly, imitation must occur in some
other industry, changing this from a monopoly into a duopoly.
(iii) The profits of a typical monopoly and a typical duopolist are constant
over time.
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(iv) The wage w, total labor in production, x, and total labor in R&D, l,
are constants over time.
(v) The labor input η of a typical innovating firm in R&D, the labor input
ψ of a typical imitating firm in R&D, and the average growth rate of
consumption, g, are constants over time.
3.1 The production of goods
The representative consumption-good firm maximizes its profit
Πc
.
= Py −
∫
j∈[0,1]
nj∑
κ=1
pjκxjκdj
subject to technology (5), given the output price P and the input prices pjκ.
Noting (2), this implies
Πc = 0, pjκ = P
∂y
∂xjκ
= φκP
y
xjκ
=
φκ
xjκ
for all κ. (10)
All intermediate-good firms produce one unit of their output from one la-
bor unit. The product of the newest generation provides exactly the constant
µ > 1 times as many services as that of earlier generation. A firm of earlier
generation earns the profit Πojκ = (p
o
jκ − w)xoj , where pojκ is its output price
and xojκ its output. Every firm with the newest technology pushes and keeps
the firms with older technology out of the market by choosing its price pjκ so
that these earn no profit, Πojκ = 0 and p
o
jκ = w. This yields pjκ/µ = p
o
jκ = w.
Noting this, (5) and (10), one obtains the equilibrium conditions:
pjκ = µw, xjκ =
φκ
pjκ
=
φκ
µw
, Πjκ = (pjκ − w)xjκ = φκΠ, xj = 1
µw
and
x
.
=
∫
j∈[0,1]
xjdj =
1
µw
for all j and κ; Πj1 = Π
.
= 1− 1
µ
> 0 for nj = 1;
(11)
where x is total employment in production [cf. (1)]. Thus, the property (iii)
of a stationary-state equilibrium is proven.
Noting (11), one can observe the following. First, the innovator will
earn the constant profit Π as long as it remains the monopoly producer in
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the industry. Because a household holds the share of all firms in its same
portfolio, it does not invest in innovative R&D in the monopoly industries.
Second, if anyone invests in imitative R&D to enter a monopoly industry j,
then its prospective profit is Πj2, but if it does that (with the same cost)
to enter an industry j with κ > 1 producers, then its prospective profit is
Πj,κ+1 < Πj2. Thus, it invest in imitative R&D only to enter a monopoly
industry, but not to enter an oligopoly industry. This means that there
can be at most two producers in an industry. From (a) and (b) above it
follows that in equilibrium there are only monopoly industries with imitative
R&D or duopoly industries with innovative R&D. Thus, the property (i) of
a stationary-state equilibrium is proven.
I denote the set of monopoly industries by Θ ⊂ [0, 1]. The relative pro-
portion of duopoly industries, β, and the relative proportion of monopoly
industries, α, are then given by
β
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ
dj, α =
∫
j∈Θ
dj = 1− β. (12)
Thus, the property (ii) of a stationary-state equilibrium is proven. Following
Mukoyama (2003) and Tang and Wa¨lde (2001), I define the proportion of
duopoly industries in the economy, β, as the scale of competition.
3.2 Employment, output and growth
Given (1) and (5), the wage w becomes a function of total labor in R&D, l:
w =
1
µx
=
1
µ
1
N − l , w
′ > 0. (13)
This proves the property (iv) of a stationary-state equilibrium. Higher de-
mand for labor in R&D (i.e. a bigger l) raises the wage w.
According to the properties (i) and (ii) of a stationary-state equilibrium,
duopolists labeled 1 and 2 innovate and none imitates in duopoly industries
j /∈ Θ, while outsiders imitate and none innovates in monopoly industries
j ∈ Θ. Because according to technology (9) imitation yields constant returns
to scale, all outsiders in monopoly industry j ∈ Θ behave as if there were a
single outsider firm labeled 0. The structure of industries is given by Fig. 2.
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Figure 2: Competition and the number of firms in the economy.
In duopoly industries j /∈ Θ the two producers employ lj1 + lj2 and in
monopoly industries j ∈ Θ the outsider employs lj0 labor units in R&D.
Total employment in R&D, l, is the sum of all firms’ employment in R&D:
l
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj +
∫
j∈Θ
ljdj. (14)
Given (7), the average productivity in the economy, B, is defined as a function
of the technologies τj of all industries j ∈ [0, 1] as follows:
log B
.
=
∫ 1
0
log Bjdj = (log µ)
∫ 1
0
τjdj. (15)
Noting (1), (5), (11), (12) and (15), aggregate consumption y takes the form
y = e²[α log 1+β log 2]xB = e²β log 2xB = eδβ(N − l)B, δ .= ² log 2 > 0. (16)
The arrival rate of innovations in duopoly industry j /∈ Θ is the sum
of the arrival rates of both duopolists in that industry, Λj1 + Λj2 [Cf., (8)].
Because only duopoly industries j /∈ Θ innovate, then the average growth
rate of the average productivity B({tk}) in the stationary state is given by
g
.
= (log µ)
∫ 1
0
Pr(τj increases by one)dj = (log µ)
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj, (17)
where Pr(·) denotes the probability.
9
3.3 Innovation and imitation
In monopoly industry j ∈ Θ outsider 0 and in industry j /∈ Θ duopolists 1
and 2 issue shares to finance their labor expenditure in R&D. Because the
households ι ∈ {1, ..., N} invest in these shares, one obtains
N∑
ι=1
Sιj0 = wlj0 for j ∈ Θ,
N∑
ι=1
Sιjκ = wljκ for κ ∈ {1, 2} and j /∈ Θ, (18)
where wlj0 is the imitative expenditure of outsider 0 in monopoly industry j ∈
Θ, wljκ the innovative expenditure of duopolist κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j /∈ Θ,
Sιj0 household ι’s investment in outsider firm 0 in monopoly industry j ∈ Θ,
Sιjκ household ι’s investment in duopolist κ in industry j /∈ Θ,
∑N
ι=1 Sιj0
aggregate investment in outsider firm 0 in monopoly industry j ∈ Θ, and∑N
ι=1 Sιjκ aggregate investment in duopolist κ in industry j /∈ Θ. Household
ι’s relative investment shares in outsiders 0 and duopolists κ ∈ {1, 2} are
iιj0
.
=
Sιj0
wlj0
for j ∈ Θ; iιjκ .= Sιjκ
wljκ
for j /∈ Θ. (19)
When household ι has financed a successful R&D firm, it acquires the
right to the firm’s profit in proportion to its relative investment share. Noting
(11), the profit sharing in the economy can then be characterized as follows:
sιjκ household ι’s profit from duopolist κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j /∈ Θ;
iιjκ household ι’s investment share in duopolist κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j /∈ Θ
[cf. (19)];
Πjκ the profit that duopolist κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j /∈ Θ shall earn after
innovation has changed it into a monopoly;
Πjκiιjκ the profit that household ι shall get from duopolist κ ∈ {1, 2} in
industry j /∈ Θ after innovation has changed this into a monopoly;
sιj0 household ι’s profit from outsider 0 in industry j ∈ Θ;
iιj0 household ι’s investment share in outsider 0 in industry j ∈ Θ [cf. (19)];
Πj2 the profit that outsider 0 in industry j ∈ Θ shall earn after imitation
has changed it as the second duopolist;
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Πj2iιj0 the profit that household ι shall get from outsider 0 in industry j ∈ Θ
after imitation has changed it into the second duopolist.
The changes in the profits of firms in industry j are functions of the
increments (dqj1, dqj2, dQj0) of Poisson processes (qj1, qj2, Qj0) as follows:
5
dsιjκ = (Πjκiιjκ − sιjκ)dqjκ − sιjκdqj(ζ 6=κ) when j /∈ Θ;
dsιj0 = (Πj2iιj0 − sιj0)dQj0 when j ∈ Θ. (20)
These functions can be explained as follows. If a household invests in inno-
vating duopolist κ in industry j /∈ Θ, then, in the advent of a success for
that duopolist, dqjκ = 1, the amount of its share holdings rises up to Πj1iιjκ,
dsιjκ = Πj1iιjκ − sιjκ, but in the advent of success for the other duopolist
ζ 6= κ, its share holdings in duopolist κ fall down to zero, dsιjκ = −sιjκ.
If a household invests in imitating outsider 0 in monopoly industry j ∈ Θ,
then, in the advent of a success for firm 0, dQj0 = 1, the amount of its share
holdings rises up to Πj2iιj0, dsιj0 = Πj2iιj0 − sιj0.
3.4 Households
Because investment in shares in R&D firms is the only form of saving in the
model, the budget constraint of household ι is given by
Aι = PCι +
∫
j∈Θ
Sιj0dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(Sιj1 + Sιj2)dj, (21)
where Aι is the household’s total income, Cι its consumption, P the consump-
tion price, Sιj0 the household’s investment in outsider firm 0 in monopoly
industry j ∈ Θ, and Sιjκ the household’s investment in duopolist κ in indus-
try j /∈ Θ. Household ι’s total income Aι consists of its wage income w (the
household supplies one labor unit), its profits sιj1 from the monopoly in each
industry j ∈ Θ and its profits sιj1 and sιj2 from the duopolists 1 and 2 in
each industry j /∈ Θ. This yields
Aι = w +
∫
j∈Θ
sιj1dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(sιj1 + sιj2)dj. (22)
5This extends the idea of Wa¨lde (1999a, 1999b).
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Household ι maximizes its utility (3) by its investment, {Sιj0} for j ∈ Θ
and {Sιj1, Sιj2} for j /∈ Θ, subject to its budget constraint (21), the stochas-
tic changes (20) in its profits, the composition of its income, (22), and the
determination of its relative investment shares, (19), given the arrival rates
{Λjκ,Γj0}, the wage w and the consumption price P . In Appendix A, this
maximization problem is solved by a similar dynamic program as in Palokan-
gas (2008), with the following result.6 In the households’ stationary equilib-
rium in which the allocation of resources is invariable across technologies,
the following conditions are satisfied (cf. Appendix A)
ljκ = η(a, ϕ) for j /∈ Θ,
lj0 = ψ
.
= 1
1−β [l − 2βη(a, ϕ)] for j ∈ Θ,
∂η
∂a
> 0,
∂η
∂ϕ
> 0, (23)
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g =
µσλ∆(l)
η(a, ϕ)ν
with ∆(l)
.
=
(N − l)2µ
N/Π− l ,
∆′
∆
=
d log∆
dl
=
1
N/Π− l −
2
N − l < 0 and 1−
l∆′
∆
>
N
N − l , (24)
g = (2λ log µ)βη(a, ϕ)1−ν. (25)
According to (23), with longer or broader patents (i.e. a bigger a or a bigger
ϕ), households invest more in each innovative firm to escape the competition
(i.e. η rises). For given innovative investment η per firm, there is a trade-off
between patent length a and patent breadth ϕ. According to (24), a house-
hold’s subjective discount factor ρ+ 1−µ
σ
log µ
g is equal to the marginal rate of
return to savings, µσλ∆(l)/η(a, ϕ)ν , which is a decreasing function of patent
length a, patent breadth ϕ and total employment in R&D, l. According to
(25), an increase in patent length a, patent breadth ϕ or the scale of compe-
tition β increases the growth rate g. Given (23) and (25), the property (v) of
a stationary-state equilibrium is proven.
4 The product cycle
Given the property (ii) of the stationary-state equilibrium, the rate at which
industries leave the group of duopoly industries k /∈ Θ in a small interval dt,
β(Λj1 + Λj2)dt, is then equal to the rate at which the industries leave the
6A detailed proof will be delivered to a reader on request.
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group of monopoly industries j ∈ Θ, αΓj0dt in that interval dt:
β(Λk1 + Λk2) = αΓj0 for k /∈ Θ and j ∈ Θ. (26)
From equations (8), (9), (12), (23) and (26) it follows that
1 =
Λk1 + Λk2
αΓj0/β
=
a(l1−νk1 + l
1−ν
k2 )
(1− β)lj0/β =
2aη1−ν
l/β − 2η .
Solving for the scale of competition, β, yields
β = (η + aη1−ν)−1l/2. (27)
Given (24), the inverse of the function ∆ is
l = ∆−1
((
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
) ην
λµσ
)
. (28)
Inserting (27) and (28) into (25) and noting (7), (8), and (24), one obtains
g =
λ log µ
ην + a
∆−1
((
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
) ην
λµσ
)
.
= J(g, a, η, ρ),
∂J
∂g
=
1− µσ
log µ
ηνg
λµσl∆′
> 0,
∂J
∂ρ
=
ηνg
λµσl∆′
< 0,
∂J
∂a
= − g
ην + a
< 0,
∂J
∂η
=
νgην−1
λµσl∆′
(
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
)
− νgη
ν−1
ην + a
=
(
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
)ν
η
∂J
∂ρ
+ νην−1
∂J
∂a
< 0. (29)
The equation (29) defines the growth rate g as a function of χ. Unfortunately,
the variable g appears in both sides of the equation, which makes this de-
pendence mathematically ambiguous. This ambiguity can be eliminated by
the stability properties of the model. Assume that vector (χ, η, λ) changes
so that J(g, χ, η, λ) increases.7 This raises the growth rate g by the same
amount, which generates a further increase ∂J/∂g in J . If ∂J/∂g < 1, there
will be a sequence of dampening increases in g until a new equilibrium is at-
tained. If ∂J/∂g > 1, then there will be ever accelerating increases in g and
7Formally, this can be proven as follows. Assume that an increase in the growth rate g
is in fixed proportion $ > 0 to the perturbation G(g, pi, β)− g from the equilibrium: g˙ =
$[J(g, a, ϕ, σ)−g]. This system has a stable equilibrium only if ∂g˙/∂g =$[∂J/∂g−1] < 0,
which is equivalent to ∂J/∂g < 1.
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the system will never end up with an equilibrium. Because the comparative
static properties of a constant-growth equilibrium cannot be analyzed by an
unstable model,8 I assume ∂J/∂g < 1. Given 0 < ∂J/∂g < 1 and (24), the
comparative statics of the equation (29) implies the function
g = G(a, η, ρ),
∂G
∂a
.
=
∂J
∂a
/(
1− ∂J
∂g
)
< 0,
∂G
∂ρ
.
=
∂J
∂ρ
/(
1− ∂J
∂g
)
< 0,
∂G
∂a
/
∂G
∂ρ
=
∂J
∂a
/
∂J
∂ρ
= − λµ
σl∆′
(ην + a)ην
,
∂G
∂η
.
=
∂J
∂η
/(
1− ∂J
∂g
)
=
(
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
)ν
η
∂G
∂ρ
+ νην−1
∂G
∂a
< 0. (30)
The results (30) can be explained as follows. When households are less
patient (i.e. the rate of time preference, ρ, is higher), their subjective discount
factor ρ+ 1−µ
σ
log µ
g is higher, they save less and invest less in R&D [i.e. l falls,
cf. (24)]. With a lower level of R&D, the growth rate g falls. Assume that
patent length a or patent breadth ϕ decreases (i.e. a or η(a, ϕ) decreases).
This reduces households’ incentives to invest in innovative R&D. In that case,
a smaller proportion α of industries with end up as monopolies and a larger
proportion β will remain as duopolies [cf. (27)]. With a larger proportion β
of innovating duopolies, the growth rate g will be higher [cf. (25)].
5 The government
Given (27), (28) and (30), there is one to-one-correspondence from patent
length a and patent breadth ϕ to the growth rate g and the scale of compe-
tition, β. This means that I can solve the optimum in two stages. First, I
replace (a, ϕ) by (g, β) as the control variables in the government’s optimal
program and obtain the government’s optimum in terms of (g, β). Second,
in subsection 6.3, I transform the optimum so that it can be expressed in
terms of patent length a and patent breadth ϕ.
From a household’s equilibrium conditions (24) and (25) it follows that
λµσ∆(l)
[
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
]−1
= ην =
[
g
(2λ log µ)β
]ν/(1−ν)
.
8Only in a stable system, a small change of the vector (ϕ, a, σ) generates a small change
in the equilibrium value of the endogenous variable g.
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Noting (8) and (24), this defines total employment in R&D, l, as the following
function of the growth rate g and the scale of competition, β:
l(g, β, ρ),
∂l
∂β
=
ν/β
ν − 1
∆(l)
∆′(l)
> 0,
∂l
∂ρ
=
∆(l)
∆′(l)
/(
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
)
< 0,
∂l
∂g
=
[
ν/g
1− ν +
1− µσ
log µ
(
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
)−1]
∆(l)
∆′(l)
. (31)
Given (2), the symmetry across the households ι = 1, ..., n yields Cι = y/N .
Noting Cι = y/N , (16) and (31), a single household’s consumption relative
to the level of productivity, c
.
= Cι/B({tk}), can be written as follows:
c(g, β, ρ)
.
=
Cι
B({tk}) =
y/N
B({tk}) = e
δβ
[
1− l(g, β, ρ)
N
]
,
1
c
∂c
∂g
=
1
l −N
∂l
∂g
< 0,
1
c
∂c
∂β
= δ +
1
l −N
∂l
∂β
. (32)
Noting this, a single household’s utility function (3) takes the form
U(Cι, T ) = E
∫ ∞
T
c(g, β, ρ)σB({tk})σe−ρ(ν−T )dν. (33)
The government chooses the growth rate g and the scale of competition,
β, to maximize a household’s welfare (33) subject to stochastic technological
change (8). I denote by Υ({tk}) the value of any industry using current tech-
nology tk, and by Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
the value of industry j using technology
tj+1, when other industries k 6= j use current technology tk. In each duopoly
industry j /∈ Θ, the arrival rate of innovations that change technology from
tj to tj+1 is equal to Λj1 + Λj2, while there are no innovations in monopoly
industries j ∈ Θ. Noting this, the Bellman equation for the government’s
maximization problem is given by9
ρΥ({tk}) = max
g,β
F(g, β, ρ), where
F(g, β, ρ) .= c(g, β)
σ
B({tk})−σ +
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)
[
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)−Υ({tk})]dj.
Because in equilibrium technological change is symmetric throughout all in-
novating industries,
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)−Υ({tk}) = Υ(tι + 1, {tk 6=ι})−Υ({tk}) for j /∈ Θ,
9Cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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then, noting (17), this Bellman equation changes into
ρΥ({tk}) = max
g,β
F(g, β, ρ), where
F(g, β, ρ) = c(g, β, ρ)
σ
B({tk})−σ +
[
Υ
(
tι + 1, {tk 6=ι}
)−Υ({tk})] ∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj
=
c(g, β, ρ)σ
B({tk})−σ +
[
Υ
(
tι + 1, {tk 6=ι}
)−Υ({tk})] g
log µ
. (34)
6 Public policy
6.1 The welfare-maximizing scale of competition
Noting (32) and (34), one obtains
β = argmax
β
F(g, β, ρ) = argmax
β
c(g, β, ρ). (35)
This can be rephrased as:
Proposition 1 The welfare-maximizing scale of competition is the scale β
of competition that maximizes current consumption c.
The change of duopoly industries into monopoly industries has two opposite
effects on consumption:
(a) It increases the variety of products and the index of consumption.
(b) Because duopolies employ more than monopolies, it increases total in-
vestment in R&D and deprives these resources from the production of
the consumption good.
The opposite effects (a) and (b) are in balance when innovative R&D per
firm maximizes consumption.
The first-order condition corresponding to (35) is ∂c/∂β = 0. Given (31)
and (32), this condition is equivalent to
ν/β
ν − 1
∆(l)
∆′(l)
=
∂l
∂β
= (N − l)δ. (36)
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Noting (11) and (24), this equation defines that at the government’s opti-
mum the scale of competition, β, must be negatively associated with total
employment in R&D, l:
β(l)
.
=
ν/δ
ν − 1
∆(l)
∆′(l)
1
N − l =
ν/δ
1− ν
(
1 +
1− Π
1− lΠ/N
)−1
,
β′ < 0,
− β
′
β
=
(1− Π)Π/N
[2− (1 + l/N)Π](1− Πl/N) <
Π/N
2(1− Π) . (37)
Because duopolies employ more workers in production than monopolies, a
transfer of labor from R&D to production (i.e. a smaller l) is associated with
a higher proportion β of duopoly industries.
6.2 The welfare-maximizing growth rate
I try the solution that the value function is of the form
Υ({tk}) = cσB({tk})σ/ϑ (38)
where ϑ is independent of the endogenous variables of the system. From (7),
(15) and (38) it then follows that
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
Υ({tk}) =
(
B
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
B({tk})
)σ
=
(
Bj(tj + 1)
Bj(tj)
)σ
= µσ. (39)
Inserting (38) and (39) into the Bellman equation (34), we obtain
ρ = ϑ+ (µσ − 1)
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj = ϑ+ (µ
σ − 1) g
log µ
and
ϑ = ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g. (40)
Noting (31), (32), (36), (37), (38), (39) and (40), one obtains
∂F
∂g
= σcσ−1Bσ
∂c
∂g
+
µσ − 1
log µ
Υ({tk}) =
[
ϑ
g
c
∂c
∂g
+
µσ − 1
σ log µ
g
]
σ
g
Υ({tk})
=
[(
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
)
g
c
∂c
∂g
+
µσ − 1
σ log µ
g
]
σ
g
Υ({tk})
=
[(
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
)
g
l −N
∂l
∂g
+
µσ − 1
σ log µ
g
]
σ
g
Υ({tk})
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={(
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
)[
ν
1− ν +
1− µσ
log µ
g
(
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
)−1]
1
l −N
∆(l)
∆′(l)
+
µσ − 1
σ log µ
g
}
σ
g
Υ({tk})
=
{[
ν
1− ν
(
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
)
+
1− µσ
log µ
g
]
1
l −N
∆(l)
∆′(l)
+
µσ − 1
σ log µ
g
}
σ
g
Υ({tk})
=
{[
ν
1− ν
(
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
)
+
1− µσ
log µ
g
]
1− ν
ν/δ
β +
µσ − 1
σ log µ
g
}
σ
g
Υ({tk})
=
{[
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g +
(1
ν
− 1
)1− µσ
log µ
g
]
δβ +
µσ − 1
σ log µ
g
}
σ
g
Υ({tk})
=
[
log µ
µσ − 1
ρ
g
+
1
δσβ(ξ(a, η))
− 1
ν
]
µσ − 1
log µ
gδβ
σ
g
Υ({tk}). (41)
According to (41), there is ∂F/∂g > 0 in the case σδβ < ν. Noting the
structure of the function (5), this result can be rephrased also as follows:
Proposition 2 There can be a finite welfare-maximizing growth rate only if
the households appreciate product variety high enough (i.e. if δ > ν/(σβ)).
If the households do not appreciate product variety high enough (i.e. if
δ ≤ ν/σ), then it is socially optimal to allocate more labor in R&D and to
speed up growth indefinitely. For the remainder of this paper, I focus on the
case where there is a welfare-maximizing growth rate:
δ > ν/(σβ). (42)
The first-order condition corresponding to the maximization F in (34) by
the growth rate g is ∂F/∂g = 0. This, (41) and (42) imply that the optimal
growth rate g is an increasing function of the rate of time preference ρ:
g =
[
1
ν
− 1
δσβ(ξ(a, η))
]−1
ρ log µ
µσ − 1 ,
dg
dρ
=
g
ρ
,
ρ log µ
(µσ − 1)g =
1
ν
− 1
δσβ
<
1
ν
.
(43)
6.3 The welfare-maximizing patent shape
In subsections 6.1 and 6.2, the government’s optimum was defined in terms
of the scale of competition, β, and the growth rate g. In this subsection, I
define the patent shape (a, ϕ) that corresponds to that optimum.
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Inserting (37) into the equation (27) yields l/β(l) = 2(η+ aη1−ν). Noting
(37), this equation defines that at the government’s optimum total labor
devoted to R&D, l, must be an increasing function of both patent length a
and patent breadth ϕ:
l = ξ(a, η),
∂ξ
∂a
=
(
1
l
− β
′
β
)−1
1
a+ ην
> 0,
∂ξ
∂η
=
(
1
l
− β
′
β
)−1
ην + 1− ν
(a+ ην)η
=
(
ην−1 +
1− ν
η
)
∂ξ
∂a
> 0. (44)
With an increase in patent length a or patent breadth ϕ, a larger proportion
α of industries will end up as monopolies and a smaller proportion β as
duopolies. Because monopolies employ less in production, this reduces the
demand for labor in production. With lower employment in production,
wages fall and R&D firms employ more labor (i.e. l increases).
To obtain an unambiguous solution, I make the plausible assumption10
ν >
(
1 + 2
1− Π
Π
/
l
N
)−1
,
(45)
where 1−ν is the returns-to-scale parameter in innovative R&D [cf. (8)], l/N
the proportion of labor devoted to R&D and Π/(1 − Π) the ratio of profits
to wages in production. If the returns to scale in innovative R&D are too
decreasing, so that (45) does not hold, then the results are unambiguous.
Given (24), (27), (30), (44) and (43), there is a system of two equations
g(ρ) = G(a, η, ρ), ξ(a, η) = ∆−1
((
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g(ρ)
) ην
λµσ
)
, (46)
where a and ϕ are unknown variables and ρ is an exogenous variable. Differ-
entiating this system totally and noting (24), (44) and (43), one obtains [cf.
Appendix B]
da/dρ < 0, dϕ/dρ > 0. (47)
These results can be rephrased as follows:
10In advanced economies, the proportion of research workers, l/N , is less than 15 and
the ratio of profits to wages in production, Π/(1 − Π), less than 12 . This implies ν > 121
and 1− ν < 2021 . It is plausible to assume that the returns to scale parameter in innovative
R&D, 1− ν, is less than 2021 .
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Proposition 3 The less patient the households in the economy (i.e. the
bigger ρ), the shorter (i.e. the smaller a) and the broader (i.e. the bigger ϕ)
the welfare-maximizing patent.
The interpretation of proposition 3 is the following. When households
are impatient (i.e. ρ is high), their subjective discount factor ρ+ 1−µ
σ
log µ
g is
high. Provided that innovative investment per firm η(a, ϕ) is held constant,
this decreases their savings, investment and employment l in R&D [cf. (24)].
In order to maintain full employment, the government must decrease patent
length a to increase the proportion β of duopoly industries, because duopolies
employ more workers in production than monopolies. Simultaneously, it must
increase patent breadth ϕ to hold innovative investment per firm η(a, ϕ)
constant [cf. (23)]. This shows that patents should be taylored short and
wide for an economy with impatient households.
7 Conclusions
This study examines a multi-industry economy in which growth is generated
by creative destruction. In each industry, a firm that creates the newest
technology by a successful innovation crowds out the other firms with older
technologies from the market and becomes the first producer of the industry.
A firm creating a copy of the newest technology starts producing a close sub-
stitute for the innovator’s product and establishes an innovation race with the
first producer. Because systematic investment risk cannot be eliminated by
diversification, the households hold the shares of all firms in their portfolios.
Innovations are protected by patents. Some characteristics of a patent
postpone the expected time the patent will be imitated (e.g. increase patent
length), while the others protect the patentee’s profits after a successful im-
itation (i.e. increase patent breadth). With these two instruments, the gov-
ernment can regulate innovative and imitative R&D, economic growth and
social welfare. The main findings of this study are as follows.
An increase in patent breadth or patent length increases innovative R&D
per firm. This changes duopoly industries into monopoly industries, which
has two opposite effects on consumption: It decreases the variety of products
and lowers the index of consumption. On the other hand, because duopolies
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employ more than monopolies, it decreases total investment in R&D and
releases resources from R&D to consumption. These opposite effects are in
balance when innovative investment per firm maximizes consumption. When
this optimal consumption is maintained, there is a trade-off between patent
breadth or patent length. This means that patents must be taylored either
broad and short or narrow and long.
Because monopolies have no incentives to innovate, the growth rate in-
creases with the proportion of duopoly industries. With non-diversifiable
risk, there is a trade-off between patent length and patent breadth for given
innovative investment per firm. When households are impatient, they save
less and and invest less in R&D. This, in turn, decreases employment in R&D.
In order to maintain full employment, the government must decrease patent
length to increase the proportion of duopoly industries, because duopolies
employ more workers in production than monopolies. Simultaneously, it
must increase patent breadth for given innovative investment per firm. Thus,
patents should be taylored short and wide for with impatient households.
Appendix
A. Results (23)-(25)
I denote:
{sιkυ} vector of sιkυ for k ∈ [0, 1] and υ ∈ {0, 1, 2},
{sι(k 6=j)υ} vector of sιkυ for k ∈ [0, 1], k 6= j and υ ∈ {0, 1, 2},
{τk} vector of τk for k ∈ [0, 1],
{τk 6=j} vector of τk for k ∈ [0, 1] and k 6= j.
According to (11), the profit of a monopoly is Π and the profit of the first
(second) duopolist Πj1 = φ1Π (Πj2 = φ2Π). I define the following value
functions:
Ω
({sιkυ}, {τk}) the value of receiving profits sιkυ from all firms υ in all in-
dustries k using current technology τk.
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Ω
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, τj + 1, {τk 6=j}
)
the value of receiving the profit Πiιjκ
from firm κ in industry j /∈ Θ using technology τj +1, but receiving no
profits from the other firm which was a producer in that industry when
technology τj was used, and receiving profits sι(k 6=j)υ from all firms υ
in other industries k 6= j with current technology τk.
Ω
(
φ1Πiιj1, φ2Πiιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {τk}
)
the value of receiving profits φ2Πiιjκ from
firms κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j ∈ Θ, but receiving profits sι(k 6=j)υ from
all firms υ in the other industries k 6= j with current technology τk.
Household ι maximizes its utility (3) by its investment, {Sιj0} for j ∈ Θ and
{Sιj1, Sιj2} for j /∈ Θ, subject to (19), (20), (21) and (22), , taking w, P and
{Λjκ,Γj0} for all j and κ as exogenous. The Bellman equation associated
with the household’s maximization is11
ρΩ
({sιkυ}, {τk}) = max
Sιj ≥ 0 for all j
Ξι (48)
with
Ξι
.
= Cσι +
∫
j∈Θ
Γj0
[
Ω
(
φ1Πiιj1, φ2Πiιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {τk}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {τk})]dj
+
∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
Λjκ
[
Ω
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, τj + 1, {τk 6=j}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {τk})]dj,
(49)
where ρ is the rate of time preference (constant), Cσι the household’s instan-
taneous utility, Λjκ the arrival rate of innovations that increases the value of
profits from duopolist κ in industry j /∈ Θ by the amount
Ω
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, τj + 1, {τk 6=j}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {τk}),
and Γj0 the arrival rate of imitations that increases the value of profits from
outsider 0 in industry j ∈ Θ by the amount
Ω
(
φ1Πiιj1, φ2Πiιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {τk}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {τk}).
Because ∂Cι/∂Sιjκ = −1/P by (21), the first-order conditions are given by
Λjκ
d
dSιjκ
[
Ω
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, τj + 1, {τk 6=j}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {τk})] = σ
P
Cσ−1ι
for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2}, (50)
11Cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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Γj0
d
dSιj0
[
Ω
(
φ1Πiιj1, φ2Πiιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {τk}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {τk})] = σ
P
Cσ−1ι
for j ∈ Θ. (51)
I try the solution that for each household ι the propensity to consume,
hι, and the subjective interest rate rι are independent of income Aι, i.e.
PCι = hιAι and Ω = C
σ
ι /rι. I denote variables depending on technology τj
by superscript τj and a vector that consists of tk for all k by {tk}. Since
according to (22) income A
{τk}
ι depends directly on variables {sτkιk}, I denote
A
{τk}
ι ({sτkιk}). Assuming that hι is invariant across technologies yields
P {τk}C{τk}ι = hιA
{τk}
ι ({sτkιk}). (52)
The share in the next innovator τj+1 is determined by investment under the
present technology τj, s
τj+1
ιjκ = Πi
τj
ιjκ for j /∈ Θ. The share in the next imitator
is determined by investment under the same technology τj, s
τj
ιjκ = φκΠi
τj
ιjκ
for j ∈ Θ. The value functions are then given by
Ω
({sιkυ}, {τk}) = Ω(φ1Πiιj1, φ2Πiιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {τk}) = 1
rι
(
C{τk}ι
)σ
,
Ω
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, τj + 1, {τk 6=j}
)
=
1
rι
(
C
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
)σ
. (53)
Given this, one obtains
∂Ω
({sιkυ}, {τk})
∂S
τj
ιj
= 0. (54)
From (19), (22), (52), (53), s
τj+1
ιjκ = Πi
τj
ιjκ for j /∈ Θ and κ = 1, 2, and
s
τj
ιj2 = φ2Πi
τj
ιj0 for j ∈ Θ it follows that
∂s
τj+1
ιjκ
∂i
τj
ιjκ
= Π for j /∈ Θ and κ = 1, 2, ∂s
τj
ιj2
∂i
τj
ιj0
= φ2Π for j ∈ Θ,
∂A
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
∂s
τj+1
ιjκ
=
∂A
{τk}
ι
∂s
τj
ιj0
= 1,
∂i
τj
ιj0
∂S
τj
ιj0
=
1
w{τk}l{τk}j0
for j ∈ Θ, ∂i
τj
ιjκ
∂S
τj
ιjκ
=
1
w{τk}l{τk}jκ
for j /∈ Θ,
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dΩ
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, τj + 1, {τk 6=j}
)
dS
τj
ιjκ
=
σ
rι
(
C
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
)σ−1 ∂Cτj+1,{τk 6=j}ι
∂A
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι︸ ︷︷ ︸
hι/P
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
∂A
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
∂s
τj+1
ιjκ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
∂s
τj+1
ιjκ
∂i
τj
ιjκ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Π
∂i
τj
ιjκ
∂S
τj
ιjκ
=
Πσhι
(
C
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
)σ−1
rιP τj+1,{τk 6=j}
∂i
τj
ιjκ
∂S
τj
ιjκ
=
Πhισ
(
C
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
)σ−1
rιw{τk}P τj+1,{τk 6=j}l
{τk}
jκ
for j /∈ Θ, (55)
dΩ
(
φ1Πiιj1, φ2Πiιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {τk}
)
dS
τj
ιj0
=
σ
rι
(
C{τk}ι
)σ−1 ∂C{τk}ι
∂A
{τk}
ι︸ ︷︷ ︸
=hι/P {τk}
∂A
{τk}
ι
s
τj
ιj0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
s
τj
ιj0
∂iτιj0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=φ2Π
∂iτιj0
∂Stιj0
=
φ2Πσhι
rιP {τk}
(
C{τk}ι
)σ−1 ∂iτιj0
∂Stιj0
=
φ2Πhισ
(
C
{τk}
ι
)σ−1
rιw{τk}P {τk}l
{τk}
j0
for j ∈ Θ. (56)
I focus on a stationary equilibrium where the growth rate g and the
allocation of labor, (ljκ, x), are invariant across technologies. Given (1),
(13), (15) and (16),, this implies
l
{τk}
jκ = ljκ, x
{τk} = x = N − l, w{τk} = w = 1/(xµ),
P {τk}
P τj+1,{τk 6=j}
=
C
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
C
{τk}
ι
=
yτj+1,{τk 6=j}
y{τk}
=
Bτj+1,{τk 6=j}
B{τk}
= µ. (57)
Inserting (17), (49), (53) and (57) into (48) yields
0 =
[
ρ+
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj +
∫
j∈Θ
Γj0dj
]
Ω
({sιkυ}, {τk})− (C{τk}ι )σ
−
∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
ΛjκΩ
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, τj + 1, {τk 6=j}
)
dj
−
∫
j∈Θ
Γj0Ω
(
pi2iιj1, pi2iιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {τk}
)
dj
=
[
ρ+
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj
](C{τk}ι )σ
rι
− (C{τk}ι )σ − ∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
Λjκ
µσ
rι
(
C{τk}ι
)σ
dj
=
1
rι
(
C{τk}ι
)σ[
ρ− rι + 1− µ
σ
log µ
g
]
.
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This equation is equivalent to
rι = ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g. (58)
Because there is symmetry throughout all households ι, their propensity
to consume is equal, hι = h. This, (4), (18), (21) and (52) yield
wl = w
∫
j∈Θ
lj0dj + w
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj = w
∫
j∈Θ
lj0dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj
=
N∑
ι=1
[∫
j∈Θ
Sιj0dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(Sιj1 + Sιj2)dj
]
=
N∑
ι=1
(Aι − PCι) = (1− h)
N∑
ι=1
Aι
= (1− h)(1 + wl)
and
hι = h = (1 + wl)
−1. (59)
Inserting (8), (9), (54), (55), (56), (57), (58) and (59) into (50) and (51),
one obtains
σΠhµσ
(
C
{τk}
ι
)σ−1
λ(
ρ+ 1−µ
σ
log µ
g
)
wP {τk}
l−νjκ =
σΠhµσ
(
C
{τk}
ι
)σ−1
λl−νjκ
rιwP {τk}
=
σΠhιµ
σ
(
C
{τk}
ι
)σ−1
Λjκ
rιwljκP {τk}
=
σΠhι
(
C
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
)σ−1
Λjκ
rιwljκP
ττj+1,{τk 6=j}
= Λjκ
d
dSιjκ
Ω
(
Πiιj, {sι(k 6=j)}, τj + 1, {τk 6=j}
)
=
σ
P {τk}
(
C{τk}ι
)σ−1
for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2}, (60)
φ2(ϕ)
a
σΠh
(
C
{τk}
ι
)σ−1
λ(
ρ+ 1−µ
σ
log µ
g
)
wP {τk}
=
σφ2Πhι
(
C
{τk}
ι
)σ−1 λ
a
rιwP {τk}
=
σφ2Πhι
(
C
{τk}
ι
)σ−1
Γj0
rιwlj0P {τk}
= Γj0
d
dSιj0
Ω
(
φ1Πiιj1, φ2Πiιj2, {sιm(k 6=j)}, {τk}
)
=
σ
P {τk}
(
C{τk}ι
)σ−1
for j ∈ Θ.
(61)
Given µ > 1, pi2 ≤ Π/2, (60) and (61), one obtains
ljκ = η(a, ϕ) for j /∈ Θ,
lj0 = ψ for j ∈ Θ, η(a, ϕ)
.
=
[
µσa
φ2(ϕ)
]1/ν
,
∂η
∂a
> 0,
∂η
∂ϕ
> 0. (62)
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Equations (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (17), (59), (61) and (62) yield
l =
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj +
∫
j∈Θ
ljdj = 2η
∫
j /∈Θ
dj + ψ
∫
j∈Θ
dj = (1− β)ψ + 2βη,
ψ = (l − 2βη)/(1− β), (63)
Λjκ = λl
1−ν
jκ = λη
1−ν for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2},
g = (log µ)
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj = (2 log µ)βΛjκ = (2λ log µ)βη
1−ν , (64)(
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
)
ην
λµσ
=
(
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
)
a
λφ2
=
hΠ
w
=
Π
(1 + wl)w
=
(N − l)2µΠ
N − l + l/µ =
(N − l)2µΠ
N − lΠ =
(N − l)2µ
N/Π− l
.
= ∆(l) with
∆′
∆
=
d log∆
dl
=
1
N/Π− l −
2
N − l <
1
N − l −
2
N − l = −
1
N − l < 0, (65)
1− l∆
′
∆
> 1 +
l
N − l =
N
N − l . (66)
Relations (62), (64), (65) and (66) yield (23)-(25). 2
B. Results (47)
Differentiating the equations (46) totally and noting (24), (30), (37), (36),
(43) and (45), one obtains
J =
∣∣∣∣∣ Ga Gηξa ξη − νην−1λµσ∆′ (ρ+ 1−µσlog µ g)
∣∣∣∣∣
= Ga︸︷︷︸
−
[
(1− ν︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)
(
ην−1 +
1
η︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)
ξa︸︷︷︸
+
+
β′/β
1/l − β′/β︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
νην−1
λµσ∆′︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
(
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)]
< 0,
da
dρ
= − 1J
∣∣∣∣∣ Gρ − g′ Gη− ηνλµσ∆′ (1 + 1−µσlog µ g′) ξη − νην−1λµσ∆′ (ρ+ 1−µσlog µ g)
∣∣∣∣∣
< − 1J
∣∣∣∣∣ Gρ Gη− ηνλµσ∆′ (1 + 1−µσlog µ g′) ξη − νην−1λµσ∆′ (ρ+ 1−µσlog µ g)
∣∣∣∣∣
< − 1J
∣∣∣∣∣ Gρ Gη− ηνλµσ∆′ ξη − νην−1λµσ∆′ (ρ+ 1−µσlog µ g)
∣∣∣∣∣
= −GρJ
[(
1
l
− β
′
β
)−1
ην + 1− ν
(a+ ην)η
− νη
ν−1l
ην + a
]
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= − GρJ︸︷︷︸
+
νην
(a+ ην)η︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(
1
l
− β
′
β︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)−1[
(1/ν − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)(1 + η−ν︸︷︷︸
+
) + l
β′
β
]
< − GρJ︸︷︷︸
+
νην
(a+ ην)η︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(
1
l
− β
′
β︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)−1[
1
ν
− 1 + lβ
′
β
]
< − GρJ︸︷︷︸
+
νην
(a+ ην)η︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(
1
l
− β
′
β︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)−1[
1
ν
− 1− 1
2
Π
1− Π
l
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]
< 0,
dη
dρ
= − 1J
∣∣∣∣ Ga Gρ − g′ξa − ηνλµσ∆′ (1 + 1−µσlog µ g′)
∣∣∣∣ > − 1J
∣∣∣∣ Ga Gρξa − ηνλµσ∆′ (1 + 1−µσlog µ g′)
∣∣∣∣
=
Gρ
J
[
−
(
1 +
1− µσ
log µ
g
ρ
)
l
ηµ + a
+ ξa
]
=
Gρ
J
[
−
(
1 +
1− µσ
log µ
g
ρ
)
l
ηµ + a
+
1
a+ ην
(
1
l
− β
′
β
)−1]
>
1
a+ ην︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(
1
l
− β
′
β︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)−1
Gρ
J︸︷︷︸
+
[(
1 +
1− µσ
log µ
g
ρ
)(
−1
2
l
N
Π
1− Π − 1
)
+ 1
]
=
1
a+ ην︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(
1
l
− β
′
β︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)−1
Gρ
J︸︷︷︸
+
[(
µσ − 1
log µ
g
ρ
− 1
)(
1
2
l
N
Π
1− Π + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)
+ 1
]
>
1
a+ ην︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(
1
l
− β
′
β︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)−1
Gρ
J︸︷︷︸
+
[
(ν − 1)
(
1
2
l
N
Π
1− Π + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)
+ 1
]
=
1− ν
a+ ην︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(
1
l
− β
′
β︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)−1
Gρ
J︸︷︷︸
+
[
−1
2
l
N
Π
1− Π − 1 +
1
1− ν︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]
> 0.
From these inequalities and the definition of η in (23) it follows that
dϕ
dρ
=
(
dη
dρ︸︷︷︸
+
− ∂η
∂a︸︷︷︸
+
da
dρ︸︷︷︸
−
)/
∂η
∂ϕ︸︷︷︸
+
> 0.
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